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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Respondent commenced this action seeking to renew three old 
judgments on which the eight year statute of limitations had run. 
Subsequent to the entry of those judgments, the Appellant moved to the 
State of Wyoming. Respondent contends that the statute of limitations 
on the judgments was tolled during Appellant's absence from the State 
of Utah. Appellant contends that the statute does not toll by the absence 
of the judgment debtor from the state on a judgment duly entered. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court found that in Civil Number 4472 in Uintah County 
judgments were entered on June 30, 1964; October 6, 1964, and December 
22, 1964. This action was commenced on April 7, 1975. The court found 
the statute was tolled and granted judgment for the plaintiff on a new cause 
of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this court reverse the judgment and 
findings of the trial court as a matter of law. Appellant contends that 
Plaintiff-Respondent did nothing to renew the judgments during the eight 
year period, and Defendant-Appellant's absence from the state did not toll 
the statute of limitations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Lile Hunting, and the Respondent, Vero 0. Hunting (Gass~ 
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The rules provide for the judgment creditor to execute during the 
eight year period and also provides for the renewing of a judgment. 
Clearly, this was not done during the eight year period from the entry of 
the judgments in Case No. 4472. 
Respondent did not at any time docket the judgments in Wyoming 
and try to enforce them when she could have executed upon her judgments. 
With due diligence she could have located the Appellant during the statutory 
eight year period. Further ... pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Respondent could have renewed the judgments by filing a complaint during 
the eight year period and completing service by publication or otherwise 
as provided by Rule 4, even though she did not have Appellant's Wyoming 
address for personal service. 
Many courts, including the utah Supreme Court, have held that 
the debtors absence from the state after the rendition of the judgment or 
the accrual of the cause of action thereon does not suspend or toll the 
period of limitations. Sweetser v. Fox, 43 U40, 134 P599 (1911); 
U. S. v. Willhite, 219 F 2d 843, 849, In the Matter of Neil S. MacKay, 
416 P 2d 823, 849 (1966); 2 ALR 3d 1385. 
Another utah case dealing with the subject is Youngdale v. Burton 
102 ut. 169, 128 P 2d 1053 (1942). The facts of this case are that in June 
of 1931, a party obtafned a judgment for money against plaintiff. Eight 
years later the period of limitations expired on the judgment and became 
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barred. In 1941, the judgment-creditor filed in the Salt Lake City Court 
praying for execution on the dormant judgment, which was granted. The 
decision was appeal, and in reversing the decision of the City Court, the 
Supreme Court of Utah unanimously held that the eight year period of 
limitation was final. The court stated that: 
"A money judgment forms the basis for but two legal 
proceedings: (a) A suit thereon, brought within eight 
years, wherein it forms the basis or chose in action 
for a new judgment, or (b) Some form of proceedings 
in execution for collection. " 
Respondent admits that no attempt to renew her judgments was 
made during the eight year period from the date of their entry. 
The most recent Utah determination on the issue of barred judg-
ments deals with an attempt by the plaintiff to renew and revive a judgment 
eight years and five months after the date of its entry. In Yergensen v. 
Ford, 16 Ut. 2d 397, 402 P. 2d 696 (1965), it is reported that the original 
judgment was rendered in 1949 in an action upon three promissory notes. 
Thereafter the judgment-debtors agreed to satisfy the judgment, but it 
wasn't until 1958 that any further action occurred by the plaintiff, at 
which time suit was instituted in the Fourth Judicial District (Judge 
Tuckett presiding). The case was dismissed on the basis of U. C. A. 
78-12-22, which states that: 
"Within eight years: An action upon a judgment or decree 
of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory 
within the United States. " 
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causes of action to judgment. Having reduced those causes of action to 
judgment, she was then bound by the eight year statute of limitations 
under U. C. A. 78-12-22 (1953). Her failure to take any action to renew 
those judgments during the eight year period now precludes her from recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred as a matter of law in granting recovery to 
the Respondent. Respondent had ample opportunity to renew the judgments 
during the eight year period of their entry whether or not she knew the 
address of the Appellant. She failed to do anything to preserve the judgments. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the decision of the lower court 
should be reversed. 
e<pedfully~ 
John C. Beaslin 
Attorney for Appellant 
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